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Abstract
Consumption risk sharing among US federal states increases in
booms and decreases in recessions. These business-cycle fluctua-
tions in interstate risk sharing are driven mainly by states in which
small firms account for a large share of income or employment.
State-level banking deregulation during the 1980s seems to have
loosened the dependence of aggregate risk sharing on the business
cycle, and this effect is again strongest in states with many small
firms. Our results support the view that better access to credit
markets may have made it easier for the owners of small firms to
smooth income in the face of adverse cash-flow shocks to their busi-
ness. They also suggest a major additional benefit from banking
deregulation: access to bank credit may have become more reliable
and more easily available when households and firms need it most
urgently—in economic downturns.
Keywords: INTERSTATE RISK SHARING, REGIONAL BUSINESS CYCLE,
PROPRIETARY INCOME, SMALL BUSINESSES, STATE BANKING DEREG-
ULATION
JEL classification: E32, E44, F3
1 Introduction
Consumption risk sharing among US federal states increases in
booms and decreases in recessions. We find that small firms play an
important role in explaining this stylized fact: business-cycle fluc-
tuations in interstate risk sharing are most pronounced in states in
which small firms account for a large share of income or employ-
ment. State-level banking deregulation during the 1980s has, how-
ever, dampened this dependence of aggregate risk sharing on the
business cycle. Our findings support the view that banking dereg-
ulation has considerably improved credit market access for small
firms, in particular in recessions, when it is most urgently needed.
Our analysis places itself at the intersection of two important
recent strands of the literature. The first strand emphasizes that
the degree to which certain household groups and small firms have
access to financial markets varies dramatically over the business
cycle. In particular, a considerable body of theoretical and empir-
ical work on the financial accelerator1 has argued that tightening
collateral constraints in credit markets may act as a potentially
powerful amplification mechanism for aggregate shocks. Gertler
and Gilchrist (1994) were among the first to illustrate empirically
that small firms with their strong dependence on bank finance are
particularly exposed to such shocks.
We provide a comprehensive taxonomy of business-cycle varia-
tion in interstate risk sharing. First, we show that the extent to
which interstate risk sharing varies with the aggregate output cycle
1We will not attempt to survey this work here. Leading examples include
Bernanke (1983), Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997).
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is quantitatively important: over our sample period, which ranges
from 1963 to 2005, on average almost 80 percent of state-specific
shocks to output are shared across state borders. However, this
average masks considerable variation over time: at the trough of
the typical NBER recession during that period, the fraction of risk
shared was almost 20 percentage points below this level. This de-
pendence of aggregate risk sharing on the business cycle is robust
to controls for other factors such as stock market and housing price
fluctuations, which, as recently argued by Lustig and van Nieuwer-
burgh (2005), may also affect the ability of households to share risk
across regional borders.
Secondly, we identify the sources of the procyclical variation in
interstate risk sharing. Specifically, we ask through which channels
risk is shared and how the contribution of these channels varies
over time. Following Asdrubali, Sørensen and Yosha (1996) we dis-
tinguish between three channels of risk sharing: income smoothing
(through interstate flows of capital and labor income), fiscal trans-
fers and consumption smoothing through personal saving and dis-
saving. As the main source of the procyclicality in aggregate con-
sumption risk sharing, we identify strong procyclical fluctuations in
the extent to which a region’s households can smooth consumption
through saving and dissaving. Importantly, this very characteristic
pattern of risk sharing over the business cycle is determined mainly
by federal states where small businesses are particularly prevalent
as employers, or where the income of small business owners ac-
counts for a large share of state personal income.
To shed more light on the role of small businesses in the time
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variation in aggregate risk sharing, we connect to a second strand
of the literature. Starting with Jayaratne and Strahan (1996), a se-
ries of studies has exploited the experience of US state-level bank-
ing deregulation during the 1970s and 1980s as a natural labo-
ratory in which to study the effect of liberalization on growth, the
comovement of regional business cycles (Morgan, Rime and Strahan
(2004)) and, more recently, risk sharing (Demyanyk, Ostergaard
and Sørensen (2007), Acharya, Imbs and Sturgess (2007)). We build
on these papers in arguing that this wave of deregulation has had
a significant impact on small firm access to credit: small firms typ-
ically cannot issue stocks or bonds, and therefore rely heavily on
bank finance. The key aspect we emphasize here is that this makes
them vulnerable to changes in local credit market conditions that
tend to worsen in downturns and to improve in booms. At the same
time, the business and private finance of small business owners are
closely intertwined, so that fluctuations in the access to business
credit are also likely to affect the ability to smooth personal con-
sumption over time. State-level banking deregulation transformed
a highly fragmented, localized banking system into a system with
larger banks that can pool funds across local and state boundaries.
We conjecture that this makes the availability of credit less depen-
dent on the phase of the business cycle, and that small firms would
be prime beneficiaries of such a development.
Our results provide strong support for this hypothesis. We docu-
ment that intrastate banking deregulation has dramatically lowered
the variability of risk sharing over the cycle: before deregulation,
each additional percentage point of GDP growth increased aggre-
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gate risk sharing by around 3–4 percentage points. This variability
in the extent to which state-level idiosyncratic risks can be shared
across the nation has almost vanished as a result of the abolition
of intrastate bank branching and merger restrictions. Again, small
firms seem to have played an important role in transmitting the
effects of this deregulation to the real economy: the procyclical pat-
tern in risk sharing is reduced most strongly in those states where
small businesses account for a large share of income or employ-
ment.
This paper is probably most closely related to Demyanyk, Os-
tergaard and Sørensen (2007), who showed that interstate income
smoothing increased by around 15 percentage points on average
following banking deregulation. Our results here suggest that the
impact of banking deregulation on the variability of risk sharing is
easily of equal importance quantitatively: banking deregulation has
made consumption risk sharing much steadier over the cycle. Con-
sumption risk is almost 20 percentage points higher than it used to
be before deregulation in the average recession.
The reduction in the variability of interstate risk sharing that we
document here is a potentially important source of the aggregate
benefits from banking deregulation. Small firms are especially ex-
posed to aggregate shocks (Gertler and Gilchrist (1994)) and it is
therefore particularly important that they can borrow in recessions.
Our findings support the view that banking deregulation has gen-
erally improved credit market access for small firms in recessions.
There is a range of possible mechanisms through which these im-
provements could have been brought about. For example, banks
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could have extended credit lines (or modified credit contracts) for
existing firms. Furthermore, they could have more readily provided
credit to new firms, or they may have become more inclined to en-
gage in relationship lending by not taking action against delinquent
borrowers during recessions in the hope of being compensated in
the next economic upswing.2 We do not attempt to distinguish be-
tween these mechanisms in detail because we believe them to be
complementary. All are consistent with our findings here.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: in the next
section, we introduce our empirical framework and use it to doc-
ument the procyclical nature of aggregate risk sharing. We also
present our data and the details of the empirical implementation.
In Section 3, we discuss our empirical results. Section 4 concludes.
2 Consumption risk sharing over the business
cycle











+ τUt + δkU + αU + ε
k
Ut, (1)
where Ckt is per capita consumption in federal state k in period t,
GSP kt is state output (’gross state product’) per head and the as-
terisk denotes the national per capita average of the respective vari-
able. The terms τUt, δkU , αU and ε
k
Ut stand for the time and state fixed
effect, a constant and the error term respectively. In such a regres-
2We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting these examples.
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sion, we can think of the estimate of βU as the amount of uninsured
idiosyncratic output risk.
Regressions such as (1) by now have some tradition in both the
micro- and the macroeconomic literature. Mace (1991), Cochrane
(1991) and Townsend (1994) were the first to suggest regressions
similar to (1) on household-level data as a test of the null of com-
plete markets. Assume that each state is represented by a stand-in
consumer and that we can associate changes in marginal utility
with consumption growth (as is the case under constant relative
risk aversion). Then, consumption growth should be independent
of a region’s business-cycle risks if financial markets are complete—
regressions of the form (1) should yield a coefficient of zero. More
recently, Asdrubali, Sørensen and Yosha (1996) have argued that
the estimate of βU may be more generally informative even if mar-
kets are incomplete: in panel regressions, βU is regularly between 0
and unity, so that 1−βU can straightforwardly be interpreted as the
share of the average region’s idiosyncratic output risk that gets laid
off in financial markets, whereas βU is the portion of nondiversified
idiosyncratic risk faced by the average region.
Estimates of βU based on regional data reported in the litera-
ture tend to fall into the range between 0.2–0.3, therefore roughly
a quarter to a third of a region’s idiosyncratic output risk remains
uninsured.3 Based on our US state-level data set here, we obtain
an estimate of just below 0.2. Such estimates are typically based on
panel regressions such as (1) and they do not generally allow for the
possibility that the amount of risk sharing that a group of regions
3See Asdrubali et al. (1996), Crucini (1999).
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achieves may actually be varying over time.
In this paper, we argue that aggregate risk sharing varies over
the business cycle. This could be because certain groups of house-
holds may find it harder to obtain consumption insurance in fi-
nancial markets during recessions than during booms. In partic-
ular, many small firms rely heavily on access to bank loans, i.e.
to credit markets, to smooth fluctuations in business cash flow.4
Fluctuations in the availability of credit over the business cycle may
therefore affect the degree of consumption risk sharing that the pro-
prietors of small businesses and possibly also their employees can
achieve. In this way, credit market restrictions may translate into
fluctuations in aggregate risk sharing across regions.
Figure 1 presents the first evidence of business-cycle variation
in interstate risk sharing: the figure plots a sequence of cross-
sectional estimates of the coefficient βU . To obtain this sequence,
we run the regression (1) as a cross-sectional regression for each
year in our sample period that ranges from 1964 to 2005:5
Δc˜kt = βU (t)Δg˜sp
k
t + τUt + ε
k
Ut, (2)
where t = 1964, ..., 2005, τUt is the constant of the time t cross-
sectional regression and εkUt is again the disturbance term. Here,
and in the remainder of the paper, we use lower-case letters with
4It is well documented that credit market frictions tend to hit small firms harder
than bigger firms that can issue their own bonds or may even be able to raise eq-
uity in stock markets. Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) showed that the credit channel
of monetary policy has a much stronger impact on small firms than on bigger
firms.
5Cross-sectional risk-sharing regressions go back to Cochrane (1991). Se-
quences of such regressions have previously been used by, e.g. Sørensen et al.
(2007) to study the impact of financial globalization on international risk sharing.
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a tilde to denote logarithmic deviations from the US aggregate, so













line in Figure 1 represents the sequence {βU (t)}, the dashed line is
aggregate US real GDP growth. The sequence of risk-sharing co-
efficients has a mean of roughly 0.2 but it fluctuates dramatically
over the cycle: βU (t) displays a negative correlation (−0.3) with ag-
gregate GDP growth—the share of nondiversified state-level idiosyn-
cratic risk increases in recessions and decreases in booms.
Closer inspection of Figure 1 reveals that the negative correla-
tion between βU (t) and GDP growth is stronger in the first half of
the sample period: for the period until 1984 it is −0.44, thereafter
it drops to −0.13. We argue that this decline in the comovement of
βU (t) with the business cycle is the result of banking deregulation
at the state level during the 1970s and 1980s.6 Figure 2 illus-
trates this point. It provides a Burns–Mitchell-type diagram that
shows the typical behavior of βU (t) around the trough of an NBER
recession, distinguishing between states that had already deregu-
lated their bank branching restrictions and those that had not. The
impact of deregulation is clearly visible: the behavior of βU (t) for
the deregulated states is flat around recession events at a value of
around 0.2. This value is almost identical to the estimate for the
representative state when we estimate βU from a panel regression
such as (1). Conversely, for the group of states that are still reg-
ulating bank branching, the estimate of the fraction of unshared
risk rises and peaks at 0.36 in the year of the business-cycle trough.
Only a year after risk sharing increases again, βU (t) falls back to the
6Note that 1984 not only marks the mid-point of our sample but also the year
in which exactly half of all states had deregulated.
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nationwide long-term average of around 0.2. Hence, at the trough
of the average NBER recession risk sharing was almost 20 (exactly:
16 = (0.36 − 0.2) × 100) percentage points below its long-run mean
for those states that had not yet deregulated their bank branching
restrictions.
The fact that business-cycle variation in risk sharing is damp-
ened by bank deregulation may suggest that certain groups of firms
and households that were previously unable to obtain credit in re-
cessions may now have obtained better access to finance. Consis-
tent with this conjecture, we find that the cycle in interstate risk
sharing is driven mainly by those states where small businesses
are particularly important. Figure 3 plots the sequence of βU (t), es-
timated once from the group of states with above-median incidence
of small businesses and once from the lower half of the distribution.
Over the period before the majority of states deregulated (1964–83)
there is a pronounced negative correlation with GDP mainly for the
group of states with lots of small businesses (−0.47), whereas for the
other group this correlation was close to zero (−0.09).
2.1 Capturing time and state variations in interstate risk
sharing
We now model business-cycle variation in interstate risk sharing
more formally. To this end, we augment the basic panel regression
(1) to include an interaction with aggregate, US-wide GDP growth:
Δc˜kt = aU ×Δg˜spkt + bUΔgdpt ×Δg˜spkt + dk′Ut1 + εkUt, (3)
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so that βU (t) = aU + bU ×Δgdpt can be interpreted as the fraction of
unshared risk that now varies over time. Here, to save space, we







and 1 is a vector of ones. Regressions
of this form are our main tool of analysis in the remainder of the
paper. If risk sharing increases in booms and decreases in reces-
sions, we would expect bU < 0. We pursue two specific hypotheses
concerning the strength of this cyclical pattern in interstate risk
sharing, i.e. on the magnitude of bU : we argue that the procyclical
pattern in risk sharing occurs mainly in states where small busi-
nesses are important. Second, we show that this cyclical pattern is
dampened—in fact it almost vanishes—once a federal state liberal-
izes its bank branching laws.
To document these facts, we adopt two different approaches. A
directly intuitive one is to split our sample by time (before/after
deregulation) and into groups of states that differ by small business
importance. A second, more formal approach augments equation (3)
to allow risk sharing to vary across federal states and across time
as a function of small business prevalence or deregulation as well
as other characteristics. To capture this variation, we generalize the
parameterization in (3) above:




+ zk′t aU , (4)
where bU , aU are now coefficient vectors that load on the vector
of state–time characteristics zkt . The term z
k′
t bU corresponds to bU
above in that it captures the cross-state and time variation in the
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sensitivity of interstate risk sharing to aggregate business-cycle fluc-
tuations. Conversely, the term zk′t aU is analogous to aU and cap-
tures the effect of the state-time characteristics on the long-term av-





is a vector of common time-varying characteristics and u′k is a vec-
tor of time-invariant state-specific characteristics whereas y′kt col-
lects all characteristics that vary across both time and state.
Plugging the specification for βkU (t) into the basic panel risk-






t aU ×Δg˜spkt respectively. The equation we effectively es-





× g˜spkt + zk′t aU × g˜spkt + yk′t cU + dk′Ut1 + εkUt (5)
To avoid spurious effects on the higher order interaction terms be-
tween zkt and Δg˜sp
k
t this specification also includes first-order terms
of those characteristics in zkt that vary both across time and state
(i.e. ykt ). The vector cU contains the associated regression coeffi-
cients.7
We now illustrate how we make use of this general framework.
For example, to measure the impact of state deregulation on risk
sharing we use dummy variables, SDkt , that are zero before and




7Potential first-order effects of the time-invariant regional (uk) and the common
but time-varying elements (xt) in zkt will be picked up by the regional fixed effects
(δkU ) and the time effects (τUt) respectively, which we include in all regressions.
Because our interest here is in the higher-order terms, i.e. in the impact of the
characteristics zk′t on the slope coefficient on state output growth, this setup allows
us to keep our regressions relatively parsimonious.
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and recognizing that SDkt varies across time and states we obtain
the following estimation equation:
Δc˜kt =
[




This particular equation is a differences-in-differences regression
where deregulation is the treatment. As we will argue, deregulation
weakens the covariation of risk sharing with GDP growth. In the
above equation, this means that bU0 < 0 and bU1 > 0.
2.2 Channels of risk sharing
The coefficient βU in (2) tells us how much of the idiosyncratic risk
faced by the average federal state remains uninsured at time t. To
better understand the nature of the frictions that drive time varia-
tion in βU (t), we also want to know how risk sharing is achieved.
Asdrubali, Sørensen and Yosha (1996) have proposed a framework
that allows us to explicitly identify three such channels of interstate
risk sharing. Here we refer to these channels as income smooth-
ing, fiscal transfers and consumption smoothing. The method by
Asdrubali et al. (1996) is based on a decomposition of the cross-
sectional variance of state output growth. To derive this decompo-






















where si and dsi denote the logarithms of state-level income and dis-
posable income respectively. We will discuss these income concepts
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shortly. Because all states face aggregate US-wide shocks that can-
not be insured by definition, we again focus on the idiosyncratic,
state-specific component of all variables and again denote it with a
tilde. Taking the covariance with Δg˜spkt on both sides and rearrang-
ing, we get






















t −Δc˜kt ,Δg˜spkt )/var(Δg˜spkt ),





The four coefficients βI , βF , βC and βU provide us with a de-
composition of the cross-sectional variance of state-specific output
growth. The coefficient βU is the same as in the basic regression
(1) above and measures the fraction of a typical state output shock
that remains unshared. Conversely, the coefficients βI , βF and βC
provide a breakdown into the contribution of the different channels
to aggregate risk sharing.
We refer to the first channel, captured by βI , as income smooth-
ing. Whereas state output measures the quantity of goods and ser-
vices produced in the state, state income captures the value of goods
and services owned by the state’s residents. The wedge between the
two variables is therefore a measure of net factor income flows8 and
8This is analogous to the difference between GDP and GNP in national income
accounting. However, unlike GNP, state income does not reflect all income flows to
a state. Specifically, it excludes income flows to legal entities (such as incorporated
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βI measures to what extent these cross-state income flows system-
atically buffer a state’s income against fluctuations in its output.
Fiscal transfers are a second channel that may provide risk shar-
ing, e.g. through the progressivity of the tax system, through the
social security system or through other direct payments. Net fiscal
transfers account for the difference between state income (SI) and
state disposable income (DSI). The coefficient βF therefore indicates
to what extent fiscal transfers allow residents of a federal state to
smooth disposable income after a shock to state output.
Finally, a state’s residents may save or dissave after observing
their (disposable) income. We refer to this third channel as con-
sumption smoothing, and we denote its contribution to overall risk
sharing with βC .
We call the vector β= [βI , βF , βC , βU ] the pattern of risk sharing.
























t −Δc˜kt = αC + βCΔg˜spkt + δkC + εkCt,







where the coefficients δkX capture state-specific fixed effects. Note
that the last equation is just the basic risk-sharing regression (1).
The set of regressions (7) assumes that β is time-invariant. How-
firms) if this income is not eventually disbursed to private households. Because
GNP data is not available at the state level, it is therefore not possible to disen-
tangle risk sharing through net interstate factor income flows from the intrastate
income smoothing achieved through the balance sheets of legal entities.
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ever, it is now straightforward to extend our setup from the previous
subsection to allow the whole pattern of risk sharing (and not only
the amount of unshared risk, βU (t)) to vary over time. Specifically,
for any of the channels X = I, F, C we can estimate equations of the
form (3) or (5) in the same way as we do for X = U . All we have to do







t , and Δd˜si
k
t −Δc˜kt to characterize how the
entire pattern of risk sharing varies across time and state.
2.3 Data
We use annual panel data for the 50 US states and for Washington
DC for the period 1963–2005. To measure regional risk sharing on
each level we employ an updated version of the data set compiled
by Asdrubali et al. (1996). These data are compiled as follows.
• State Output (GSP ). Our measure of state-level output is
state gross domestic product from the Bureau of Economic
Analysis (BEA). A conceptually very similar series was formerly
published as gross state product (GSP) but has been discon-
tinued. To avoid confusion between state-level and aggregate
(US) variables, we nonetheless continue to refer to state-level
output as GSP in this paper, and reserve the acronym GDP for
US aggregate output.
• State Income (SI). We use state personal income from the
BEA, which is defined as the sum of earnings (wages and
proprietors’ income), profits (including interest and rent) dis-
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tributed to the state’s residents and state and federal nonper-
sonal taxes (including corporate taxes and indirect business
taxes).
• Disposable State Income (DSI). Disposable income is defined
as state personal income plus federal transfers to individuals
and federal grants to state governments minus federal non-
personal taxes and contributions and federal personal taxes.
Federal grants are provided by the United States Statistical
Abstract, while federal personal taxes and transfers are avail-
able by state from the BEA.
• State Consumption (C). State consumption is defined as the
sum of private consumption and consumption by the state
government. We follow Asdrubali et al. (1996) in construct-
ing these data: state government consumption is state and
local government expenditure less state and local transfers.
Because private consumption at the state level is not available,
we proxy it by retail sales, which we rescale by the ratio of ag-
gregate US private consumption to aggregate US retail sales.
Retail sales data by state have been updated from Asdrubali et
al. (1996), and are available from the Statistical Abstract for
the United States. They are sourced to Nielsen Claritas. For
the years 1999 and 2003, however, these data are not avail-
able. We therefore proceed as follows: we obtain shopping
center retail sales by state, which are available from the Sta-
tistical Abstract of the United States from 1990 to 2005. We
then calculate the share of shopping center retail sales in to-
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tal retail sales and interpolate this share (which is quite stable
over time for individual states) for the two years in which no
observations of total state retail sales were available. We then
multiply shopping center retail sales for these years with the
interpolated share to obtain total retail sales by state. Total
retail sales by state are then rescaled uniformly across states
so as to make sure that the sum across states complies with
the US-wide total retail sales as published by the BEA.9
All these variables are turned into real per capita variables using
population data by state deflated with the Price Index of Personal
Consumption Expenditure (PCE).
We consider two measures of small business importance in a
federal state.
• Share of Proprietary Income (shapi). This is our primary
measure. We calculate the share of proprietary income as the
ratio of state proprietary income to state personal income. The
data for both personal and proprietary income are from the
BEA. Proprietary income is defined by the BEA as current-
production income of sole proprietorships, partnerships, and
tax-exempt cooperatives. It excludes dividends, monetary in-
terest received by nonfinancial business, and rental income
9The adjustment factor is generally very close to one, suggesting that the ap-
proximation is quite reasonable. To check that none of our results depended on
this interpolation, we also estimate all results in the paper including a year dummy
for 1999 and 2003 in our regressions. This does not make a noticeable difference
to our results.
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received by persons not primarily engaged in the real estate
business.
• Small Business Employment (SBEk). This is the measure
also used by Demyanyk et al. (2007). Small businesses are
establishments with less than 100 employees. We measure
small business employment as the number of people employed
in small business establishments relative to total employment
in a state in 1977. Unfortunately, this is the earliest date for
which these data are available. The data were obtained from
the Geospatial and Statistical Data Center, University of Vir-
ginia Library.
To model the dependence of aggregate risk sharing on the state of
the business cycle we use the official real GDP growth series from
the BEA and the peak and trough dates from the NBER business-
cycle database. The impact of deregulation is proxied by an in-
dicator variable. Specifically, we use data on intrastate banking
deregulation from Demyanyk et al. (2007), Table 1. These go back
to Kroszner and Strahan (1999) for the years after 1978 and Amel
(1993) for the years before. Our state deregulation dummy SDkt
is zero before deregulation and is one from the year in which in-
trastate deregulation took place in state k onwards, i.e. when the
state permitted statewide branching by mergers and acquisitions.
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2.4 Estimation issues
We estimate all of our specifications by both OLS and GLS. In the
latter case, we first estimate the respective equation for the entire
panel by OLS. Then we estimate the residual variance for each state.
In a second step, we correct for heteroskedasticity by weighting ob-
servations with the inverse of this state-specific variance. Though
our main results generally come out more strongly under GLS, we
mainly present OLS results in the paper, which give slightly higher
weight to smaller states.
As a first guard against serial and cross-sectional dependence,
all our specifications contain both time and region fixed effects.
However, region fixed effects may be insufficient to control for more
general forms of serial correlation at the regional level. As has been
argued by Bertrand et al. (2004), the impact of serial correlation
on the size of standard errors may be compounded in differences-
in-differences specifications such as (6), where the regressands and
the intervention dummy are often very persistent variables. As dis-
cussed in Petersen (2009), clustering is a quite general remedy in
this setting because it does not require any specific assumptions
about the functional form of serial dependence. Throughout the pa-
per, we therefore report standard errors clustered by state to control
for serial dependence at the state level.10
10We use an adaptation of the MATLAB routine ‘cluster-




3.1 Cyclical patterns of interstate consumption risk shar-
ing
Table 1 provides the results of the channels decomposition (7) where
we parameterize the risk-sharing pattern β(t) =
[
βI(t), βF (t), βC(t), βU (t)
]′
as:
βX(t) = aX + bXΔgdpt, (8)
for X = I, F, C, U . As Figure 1 suggested, risk sharing is much less
dependent on GDP in the second half of our sample period. We
therefore split our sample into pre- and post-1984 subperiods and
report results for these subperiods separately.
Confirming the intuition from Figure 1, we find that interstate
consumption risk sharing increases in booms and decreases in re-
cessions (i.e. βU (t) is countercyclical): in the early period, a one
percentage point increase in aggregate GDP growth would have led
to an almost 4 percentage point increase in interstate consumption
risk sharing (bU = −3.7). However, we also find that this business-
cycle dependence is limited mainly to the first period; in the second
period, the estimate of bU is much closer to zero (−0.98), and in-
significant.
Turning to the patterns of risk sharing, we see that the main
source of the procyclicality in risk sharing during the early period
is consumption smoothing—our estimate of bC is positive and sig-
nificant. This procyclicality in consumption smoothing is partly off-
set by income smoothing (βI(t)), which, interestingly, decreases in
booms and rises in recessions.11
11Countercyclical income smoothing has also been observed by Agronin (2003),
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However, overall consumption smoothing (βC(t)) is much more
strongly procyclical than income smoothing (βI(t)) is countercycli-
cal. This impact on the procyclicality in aggregate risk sharing
(1 − βU (t)) is further reinforced through the fiscal channel, even
though this effect is rather small and appears insignificant. Hence,
fluctuations in access to consumption-smoothing possibilities are
the main driver of the variation in interstate consumption risk shar-
ing over the business cycle that we observe for the early period. In
the second period, however, the cyclical pattern of income and con-
sumption smoothing—though qualitatively similar—is much less
pronounced: the associated coefficients bC and bI are now much
closer to zero, and insignificant for both channels.
These findings are robust to alternative measures of the busi-
ness cycle. In Panel B, we capture the business cycle using the offi-
cial NBER peak and trough dates, again for the pre-1984 and post-
1984 periods. Here, we also distinguish between recessions and
booms to check for the possibility of asymmetries in the dependence
of risk sharing on the cycle. The impact of the business cycle on in-
terstate risk sharing is again only significant for the first period. It
also seems somewhat stronger in recessions: the point estimate on
the recession dummy suggests that, at the trough of the average re-
cession in our sample, risk sharing was 20 percentage points below
its long-run mean. Conversely, the peak indicator has a coefficient
of only −0.12 and appears insignificant. Turning to the channels,
who suggested that the explanation might be purely mechanical: the share of
small business owners’ income (proprietary income) in US output is strongly pro-
cyclical. Because income from small businesses is not generally disbursed across
state boundaries, say through profit or dividend payments (because the owner of
a typical small business is likely to reside in the state), the share of income that
flows across state borders to provide income smoothing decreases in booms.
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we find that it is, again, the consumption-smoothing channel that
accounts for this pattern: consumption smoothing seems to drop
markedly in recessions. However, the evidence in favor of asymme-
tries is not overly strong: for both the unshared component and the
consumption-smoothing channel, the coefficients on the expansion
and recession indicators have absolute values that are not very far
apart, and are oppositely signed throughout. Based on F -tests, we
cannot reject the hypothesis that bX0 + bX1 = 0 for X = U,C. We
return to the potential role of asymmetries when we discuss the
impact of state-level banking deregulation below.
3.2 Importance of small businesses
We show next that the cyclical pattern of interstate risk sharing is
determined mainly by those states where small firms are important.
As discussed in the data description, we employ two measures
of small firm importance in a state (which we denote μ through-
out). First, we use the share of proprietary income in state personal
income (μ = shapi). This measure specifically focuses on the impor-
tance for the regional economy of those households that actually
own small businesses. Second, we use the share of total employ-
ment in small businesses of less than 100 employees (μ = SBE).
This measure emphasizes the role of small businesses as employ-
ers, and therefore in the local economy at large. One drawback here
is that state-level time series for small business employment are
only available from 1977.
For both the employment- (SBE) and income- (shapi) based mea-
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sures, we split our sample of states into three equal-sized groups
based on the importance of small businesses: high, middle or low.12
We conduct this sample split based on pre-1975 sample averages
(by state) for the proprietors’ income measure, whereas we use the
earliest available observation (1977) for the employment-based mea-
sure of small business importance. 13
We then rerun the regression specification (8) for the unsmoothed
component, βU (t), on each of these groups, again based on two sub-
periods. The results are in Panel A of Table 2: in the first period, the
coefficient on the interaction term between aggregate GDP, Δgdpt,
and the growth of gross state product, Δg˜spkt , is significantly nega-
tive for those states where small businesses are important. For the
other two groups of states, aggregate risk sharing does not seem to
covary significantly with the business cycle. The results are quali-
tatively the same, irrespective of whether we use the income- or the
employment-based measure of small business importance.14
12This follows Demyanyk et al. (2007). We refer to these groups as high-, middle-
and low-μ groups.
13We checked that it is indeed mainly the cross-sectional dispersion (and not
time variation) in μk that drives the results. We parameterized many of the regres-
sions below in a way that allows μ1 to vary across both time and state. Our results
are robust to these changes. We focus on pre-1975 (or in the case of small busi-
ness employment, the earliest available, i.e. 1977) observations for two reasons.
First, because, as we argue below, the dependence of aggregate risk sharing on the
business cycle (and the role of small business importance for the strength of this
dependence) is weaker after the deregulation wave of the mid 1980s. Secondly, the
recession of the early 1980s has had a major impact on the ranking of some big
states in terms of small business importance.
14The coefficient aU may decline as we move from the low- to the high-μ group,
but this does not necessarily mean that the high-μ group shares more risk on aver-
age. The reason for this variation in aU between the groups is mainly mechanical.
We could equivalently estimate the specification βU (t) = aiU + b
i
U (Δgdpt − Δgdp),
where Δgdp is the sample mean of aggregate GDP growth and i stands for the low-
, middle- and high-μ groups respectively. Then aiU = a
i
U − biUΔgdp is the average
amount of risk shared by group i. It is apparent that the group with the higher
business-cycle sensitivity (lower biU ) to risk sharing will necessarily have a lower
aiU , if the average amount of risk shared, a
i
U , does not vary across groups. We do
not report the demeaned specification, because this would make the interpreta-
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Turning to the second period, however, we see that the cyclicality
in risk sharing also vanishes for the high-μ states very much as it
did when we considered all states.
We then explore to what extent the entire pattern of risk sharing
is sensitive to the aggregate business cycle. We do so by parameter-
izing βX(t) as a function of the share of proprietary income in state
personal income:









where μk is the pre-1975 sample average of the share of proprietary
income for state k and μ¯ stands for the cross-sectional mean of μk.
Panel B of Table 2 presents the results for this specification. Again,
the cyclical dependence of interstate risk sharing overall (i.e. of
1− βU (t)) is stronger where small firms account for a large share of
state income. Inspecting the channels of risk sharing, we see that
this feature can again primarily be explained by the fact that the
consumption-smoothing channel, βC(t), is particularly procyclical
in states where μ1 is high.
We conclude from these findings that the business-cycle depen-
dence of interstate risk sharing is driven by the incidence of small
businesses: not only is this dependence visible mainly in high-μ
states. As the comparison over subperiods reveals, the dependence
also disappears at roughly the same time, irrespective of whether
we consider all states or just the high-μ states.
These stylized facts might, however, not be the result of a partic-
ular state having lots of small firms per se, but rather the outcome
tion of the coefficients on Δgdp less intuitive.
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of small firms being concentrated in particular sectors of the econ-
omy. Furthermore, the importance of small firms in a state could it-
self be endogenously determined by risk-sharing opportunities. We
address these issues in turn.
Robustness: controls for industrial structure, trends, etc.
In Table 3A, we repeat our regressions for βU (t), but now we also
include a number of controls to check for robustness. Specifically,
we control for a state’s industrial structure through a sectoral spe-



















where GSP sk/GSPk is the share of value-added in sector s in the total
value-added of state k. In our regressions, we use the estimates
of ISk provided in Table 1 of Kalemli-Ozcan, Sørensen and Yosha
(2001) for both the one- and the two-digit industry classification
levels. In our specification for βU (t) we then include both ISk and its
interaction with Δgdp. We also add a linear trend in the specification
for βU (t) to control for the effect of other, gradual developments that
could have affected interstate risk sharing over the sample period.
We present the results obtained from both the OLS- and the GLS-
based specifications.
Table 3A provides the findings for the two sub-periods 1963–
84 and 1985–2005. More specialized regions tend to be better in-
sured, a stylized fact first established by Kalemli-Ozcan, Sørensen
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and Yosha (2001, 2003). However, our finding that risk sharing
fluctuates significantly with GDP, and that it does so more strongly
in states with many small businesses, remains unaffected. Fur-
thermore, again, this pattern is no longer significant in the second
part of the sample.
Endogeneity of small business importance
The importance of small businesses could be simultaneously deter-
mined with risk-sharing opportunities in a state. In principle, the
impact of risk sharing on small firms could work either way: good
risk-sharing opportunities (including in particular the continued ac-
cess to financial markets in bad times) may foster the creation and
survival of small firms, implying that better risk sharing might lead
to a higher incidence of small firms in a state. If this was the case,
any potential simultaneity bias would work against us in the re-
gressions we have presented in this paper. We would then tend to
underestimate any causal impact of small firms on the cyclicality of
risk sharing. In principle, it is, however, also conceivable that small
firms are most important in those states where risk sharing is low-
est and most volatile. The reason might be that poor risk-sharing
opportunities restrain firm growth, leading to a relatively high share
of small firms in the state’s economy.15
15We also attempted to gauge which of the two sources of bias, if any, would
dominate in the data. To this end, we make use of our result, presented in the
next subsection, that banking deregulation improves risk sharing by removing
its cyclicality. Because banking deregulation can be thought of as an exogenous
improvement in risk sharing, we can ask whether it increases or lowers the impor-
tance of small businesses in a state. We ran regressions of the long-term change
of small firm importance in a state on the year in which the state deregulated.
Though insignificant for most specifications, these regressions suggest that states
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To ensure that our results are not unduly affected by endogene-
ity, we proxy small business importance using a remote lag of that
variable. Plausibly, small business importance in the remote past
is predetermined with respect to today’s aggregate business-cycle
shocks and, hence, with respect to current fluctuations in risk-
sharing opportunities. We therefore rerun our previous specifica-
tions from Table 2 based on time averages by state of μ = shapi
based on a period that ends well before our sample (the years 1950–
55). Our results (presented in Table 3B) stay qualitatively the same.
In the sample split, the coefficient on GDP growth is still much
higher in the high-μ group than in the other two groups, and signif-
icant, though only at the 10 percent level. In the specification where
the sensitivity of risk sharing to GDP growth is a linear function of μ,
the interaction between GDP and μ remains clearly significant and
correctly signed in the specification for βU (t), for both the income-
and consumption-smoothing channels. Accounting for potential en-
dogeneity of small firm importance does not affect our conclusion
that risk sharing is more cyclical in high-μ states. And again, for
both specifications, risk sharing varies significantly with the cycle
only in the first half of the sample period.
3.3 The role of banking deregulation
We have shown that business-cycle fluctuations in risk sharing are
much stronger in the first half of our sample than in the second.
that deregulated earlier tended to experience larger increases in small firm im-
portance over the sample period. We conclude from this that if any significant
simultaneity bias was present, it would lead us to underestimate the effect of
small business importance on the cyclicality of risk sharing.
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Our maintained hypothesis is that small firms’ access to credit
markets, particularly to bank loans, is a key determinant of the
extent to which interstate risk sharing fluctuates over the aggre-
gate business cycle. A major development that could have affected
the availability of credit to small firms in our sample period is the
gradual deregulation of the US banking market during the 1970s
and 1980s. Until then, the US had a highly fragmented, localized
banking system. State regulation generally prohibited the opera-
tion of out-of-state banks and also strongly limited bank branching
within a state. In some states, banks were only allowed to operate
a single branch.16 From the point of view of economic theory, one
would expect that the gradual lifting of this regulation would lead
to considerable welfare gains through the formation of bigger banks
and a better inter- and intrastate pooling of credit risk. Indeed, Ja-
yaratne and Strahan (1996) showed that federal states that deregu-
lated their banking markets earlier did eventually grow faster. They
ascribed much of this growth gain to better access by small firms
to credit. Morgan et al. (2004) found that deregulation has low-
ered the volatility of US state business cycles. In a recent important
contribution, Demyanyk et al. (2007) demonstrated that income
risk sharing increased because of state-level banking deregulation,
and they also showed that this increase was more pronounced in
states with many small businesses. While our paper is related to
Demyanyk et al.’s, our analysis differs in scope. We focus on the
role of proprietary businesses and state-level banking deregulation
16See Kroszner and Strahan (1999) for a succinct overview of the historical ori-
gins of this regulation and for a detailed account of the political and economic
determinants of deregulation.
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for business-cycle variability in risk sharing rather than on the ef-
fect of deregulation on the average level of risk sharing. Specifically,
we investigate to what extent banking deregulation has steadied in-
terstate risk sharing.
The literature distinguishes between two dimensions of state-
level deregulation: intrastate deregulation removed branching and
merger restrictions for banks and bank holding companies that
were domiciled in a state, while interstate deregulation allowed ac-
cess to the local market by out-of-state banks and bank holding
companies (often on a reciprocal basis) thus making the interstate
pooling of bank funds possible. Our focus in this paper is on in-
trastate deregulation.17
As explained in the data section, we exploit both the cross-sectional
and intertemporal dimensions of deregulation by using a dummy
variable SDkt , which becomes one from the year in which a state
deregulates.
Table 4, Panel A shows the impact of banking deregulation on
the cyclical pattern of risk sharing. Our specification for the risk-
sharing pattern βk(t), which we now estimate for the entire sample
(1964–2005), is:
βkX(t) = bX0Δgdpt + bX1Δgdpt × SDkt + aX0 + aX1SDkt . (9)
17In the working paper version (Hoffmann and Shcherbakova (2009)) we show
that this focus on intrastate deregulation is justified: we run the regressions in
this subsection based on the interstate deregulation indicator, finding that it is
generally insignificant. We also ran a horse race between the intra- and interstate
deregulation indicators, allowing both indicators to affect the cyclical dependence
of risk sharing on GDP growth. Here, only intrastate deregulation had a significant
impact on the variability of risk sharing over the cycle. Our results in this respect
clearly tie in with the findings of Jayaratne and Strahan (1996), Morgan et al.
(2004) and Demyanyk et al. (2007).
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For both the income- and consumption-smoothing channels, the
coefficients bX0 and bX1 have opposite signs and are significant. For
both channels, we cannot reject the hypothesis bX0 + bX1 = 0 at
conventional significance levels. For βU (t) we can equally not re-
ject bU0 + bU1 = 0, even though bU1 taken alone would just come
close to the 10 percent significance level.18 These findings suggest
that banking deregulation has virtually eliminated the business-
cycle variation in aggregate risk sharing.
We again examine the robustness of our findings to alternative
measures of the business cycle. Specifically, using the NBER peaks
and troughs also allows us to investigate whether deregulation has
had an asymmetric effect on risk sharing in booms and recessions.
We estimate the following specification for the pattern of risk shar-
ing:
βkX(t) = bX0Pt+bX1Tt+bX2Pt×SDkt +bX3Tt×SDkt +aX0+aX1SDkt , (10)
where Pt and Tt are dummies indicating the NBER business cycle
peaks and troughs respectively. The main feature of the results,
presented in Panel B of Table 4, is that the deregulation dummy is
strongly significant and negative in the interaction with the trough
indicator. Conversely, the point estimate of the effect of deregulation
at the peak of the business cycle is clearly insignificant. Deregula-
tion seems to improve risk sharing mainly in recessions. In fact, the
F-test that bU1+bU3 = 0 does not reject the null. Hence, deregulation
virtually eliminates the large fall in interstate risk sharing that was
18In a GLS specification with clustered standard errors, bU1 is also significant at
the 5 percent level. (t-stat of 2.6).
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characteristic of recessions before deregulation.19
As we documented earlier, business-cycle variation in interstate
risk sharing is driven by states where small firms are particularly
important. Therefore, we would expect that banking deregulation
removed the business-cycle sensitivity of risk sharing in these ‘high-
μ’ states. This is exactly what we saw in Table 2: in the early part of
the sample, the high-μ group is strongly exposed to fluctuations in
GDP, whereas the low- and middle-μ groups are not. However in the
later subsample, i.e. when most states had eventually deregulated,
risk sharing no longer depended on GDP, even for the high-μ group.
In principle, it is conceivable that this pattern could be driven
by other developments that coincided with the deregulation of bank
branching restrictions. Not so: Table 5 shows that it is indeed the
impact of banking deregulation that drives these results. We run
the same regressions as in Table 2 A for the period 1964–84, but
now we sort states into four categories: above/below median small
business importance (high/low μ) and whether the state had dereg-
ulated by 1984 or not (late/early deregulation). Risk sharing fluctu-
ated significantly with GDP growth only in high-μ states that were
late deregulators. For all other groups, in particular for the high-μ/
early deregulation group, there is no significant link of βU (t) with
aggregate GDP. Again, this holds true for both measures of small
19The results in Table 4 do not generally indicate that banking deregulation in-
creases consumption risk sharing on average: the coefficient aU1 is insignificant in
both Panel A and Panel B. According to the results in Panel B, income risk sharing
increases (aI1 > 0), which is consistent with Demyanyk et al. (2007), but con-
sumption smoothing seems to decrease (aC1 < 0). This could suggest that there
is a potentially interesting shift in the long-term pattern of risk sharing follow-
ing banking deregulation. Our focus here is on the effect of deregulation on the
cyclicality in risk sharing, and we do not explore this issue further.
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business importance.20
3.4 Interstate risk sharing and other cyclical factors
Before we conclude, we briefly elaborate on the possibility that other
cyclical factors that are highly correlated with aggregate GDP could
drive time variation in risk sharing. Specifically, we check that the
cyclicality in risk sharing that we have identified here is truly driven
by the business cycle and not by fluctuations in asset values. This
might be the case, because assets such as housing or stocks may
serve as collateral, and fluctuations in their value might therefore
lead to fluctuations in the availability of credit. We use Lettau and
Ludvigson’s (2001) cay residual as an indicator of asset price cycles,
and Lustig and van Nieuwerburgh’s (2005) housing collateral ratio
as an indicator of the availability of mortgage credit. We then pa-
rameterize βU (t) as a function of these variables and of GDP growth.
Both cay and the housing collateral ratio are generally significant
in our specifications—asset prices and collateral availability are im-
portant determinants of interstate risk sharing. However, all our
earlier conclusions concerning the role of GDP growth remain un-
affected: i) risk sharing increases when GDP growth is high and
20We also conducted a Monte Carlo experiment to check whether developments
other than banking deregulation could account for the vanishing cyclicality in risk
sharing in the second half of the sample. We follow Bertrand et al. (2004) and
Aghion et al. (2008) and assign ‘placebo’ deregulation dates to each state. The
dates are drawn randomly from the empirical distribution of our SD indicator.
We repeat this procedure 1000 times and check in what fraction of cases these
artificial interventions are significant in our regressions. We then also perform
a horse race in which we include both the actual and the placebo deregulation
dates in our regressions. All these experiments suggest that it is very unlikely that
the vanishing cyclicality in risk sharing is associated with some event other than
banking deregulation. See Hoffmann and Shcherbakova (2009) for details.
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decreases when it is low; ii) this pattern is determined by states
with lots of small businesses; and iii) it vanishes with deregulation.
Once again, see Hoffmann and Shcherbakova (2009) for detailed
results.
4 Conclusions
In this paper, we established that interstate risk sharing in the
United States varies over the business cycle, with risk sharing in-
creasing in booms and decreasing during downturns. This varia-
tion in aggregate risk sharing is quantitatively important. Over our
sample period, the average state would share almost 80 percent of
its business-cycle risk with other states. However, every percent-
age point increase in US-wide GDP growth increases interstate risk
sharing by almost four percentage points, and in the trough of the
average recession in our sample period, risk sharing was almost 20
percentage points below its mean.
We also identified a distinct pattern in how risk is shared over
the business cycle. Interestingly, we find that income smoothing
through capital income flows is countercyclical, whereas consump-
tion smoothing through saving and dissaving at the household level
is strongly procyclical. It is the latter effect that dominates, so that
aggregate risk sharing is also strongly procyclical.
We conjecture that these patterns of risk sharing are determined
by time variation in the ability of small firms to obtain credit. First,
we demonstrate that the business-cycle dependence of risk sharing
is much more pronounced in states where small firms are particu-
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larly prevalent. Second, we show that the liberalization of state-level
bank branching and holding legislation in the US has significantly
affected this pattern: banking deregulation virtually removed the
dependence of aggregate risk sharing on the business cycle, and
this reduction in cyclical dependence occurred primarily in states
where small businesses account for a large share of income or em-
ployment.
At a theoretical level, banking deregulation may affect risk shar-
ing in two ways: first, better interstate pooling of credit risk may
lead to more risk sharing on average. Second, if firms and house-
holds face collateral and borrowing constraints, the extent to which
consumption risk sharing is possible may be sensitive to the phase
of the business cycle. Our results are consistent with the view that
this second effect is particularly important: banking deregulation
seems to have improved credit market access for small firms most
when it is most needed—in cyclical downturns.
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Table 1: Risk Sharing and the Business Cycle

















t − c˜kt , c˜kt
for X = I, F , C, U respectively. βX(t) is defined as indicated in the
panel headings. Pt and Tt denote the peak and trough dates from
the NBER business cycle database. dkXt contains time and state fixed
effects and a constant (estimates not reported). The data are annual
from 1963 to 2005. T-statistics in parentheses. Significance at the
10% (5%) level is indicated by ∗(∗∗). Standard errors are based on
clustering by state.
(I) (F ) (C) (U)
Panel A: βX(t) = aX + bXΔgdpt
1964-1984
aX 0.54** 0.02 0.19** 0.25**
(9.38) (0.39) (2.11) (3.35)
bX -2.91** 0.49 6.13** -3.70**
(-2.66) (1.15) (2.33) (-2.12)
1985-2005
aX 0.67** 0.21** -0.07 0.19**
(5.23) (2.12) (-0.64) (2.07)
bX 0.57 -3.42 3.83 -0.98
(0.25) (-1.11) (1.07) (-0.49)
Panel B: βX(t) = aX + bX0Pt + bX1Tt
1964-1984
aX 0.41** 0.07** 0.40** 0.12**
(5.79) (3.28) (5.23) (2.26)
bX0 0.01 -0.12 0.23) -0.12
(0.04) (-1.15) (1.67 (-1.11)
bX1 0.13 0.00 -0.33** 0.20**
(1.17) (0.06) (-1.98) (2.36)
1985-2005
aX 0.70** 0.08** 0.06 0.16**
(9.03) (3.07) (0.68) (3.64)
bX0 -0.30** 0.05 0.08 0.18
(-3.72) (0.34) (0.46) (1.06)
bX1 0.12** 0.14 -0.09 -0.17
(2.00) (1.00) (-0.40) (-1.54)











Table 2: Risk Sharing and Small Business Importance
Panel A reports the results of the panel OLS regression Δc˜k,t = βU (t)Δg˜sp
k
t +
dk′Ut1 + εkUt for two periods: pre-1984 and post-1984. βU (t) is defined as
βU (t) = aU + bUΔgdpt. The states are split into groups according to the
importance of small businesses ("low", "middle", "high") μk. Panel B reports

















t − c˜kt , c˜kt for X = I, F , C, U respectively for
two periods: pre-1984 and post-1984. βkX(t) is defined as indicated in the
panel heading. μk denotes time-series means of the share of proprietary
income for every state k in the period from 1964 to 1975 and μ¯ is the cross-
sectional mean of μk. dkXt contains time and state fixed effects and the
constant (estimates not reported). The data are annual from 1963 to 2005.
T-statistics in parentheses. Significance at the 10% (5%) level is indicated
by ∗(∗∗). In both panels standard errors are based on clustering by state.
Panel A
μk = shapi (share of proprietary income 1964-1975)
1964-1984 1985-2005
low middle high low middle high
aU 0.16* 0.36** 0.29** 0.09 0.17 0.16
(1.92) (3.55) (3.97) (0.57) (1.53) (1.00)
bU -0.70 -1.52 -6.39** 2.37 0.87 -3.41
(-0.43) (-0.67) (-2.56) (0.82) (0.25) (-0.84)
μk = SBE (Small Business Employment in 1977)
aU 0.49** 0.20** 0.15* 0.36 0.31 0.08
(5.47) (2.08) (1.95) (1.27) (1.64) (1.60)
bU -4.65 1.05 -3.40 -2.00 -3.60 -0.29
(-1.44) (0.62) (-1.62) (-0.23) (-0.69) (-0.14)
Panel B
βkX(t) = bX0Δgdpt + bX1Δgdpt(μ
k − μ¯) + aX0 + aX1(μk − μ¯)
1964-1984 1985-2005
(I) (F ) (C) (U ) (I) (F ) (C) (U )
bX0 -0.88 0.09 3.17** -2.38** 1.33 -3.24 2.66 -0.75
(-0.94) (0.29) (2.07) (-2.14) (0.56) (-1.16) (0.85) (-0.38)
bX1 -0.01 -3.28 67.01** -63.71** -189.08** -95.11 299.52** -15.33
(-0.00) (-0.59) (2.45) (-3.16) (-3.02) (-1.09) (3.66) (-0.28)
aX0 0.54** 0.02 0.20* 0.24** 0.66** 0.20** -0.06 0.19**
(16.49) (0.46) (1.88) (3.71) (4.83) (2.24) (-0.51) (1.98)
aX1 -3.96** 0.97 1.87 1.12 2.46 3.71 -4.33 -1.84
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3B: Robustness II - Lagged Small Business Importance
Panel A reports the results of the panel OLS regression Δc˜k,t = βU (t)Δg˜sp
k
t +
dk′Ut1 + εkUt for two periods: pre-1984 and post-1984. βU (t) is defined as
βU (t) = aU + bUΔgdpt. The states are split into groups according to the im-
portance of small businesses ("low", "middle", "high") μk. Panel B reports

















t − c˜kt , c˜kt for X = I, F , C, U respectively for two
periods: pre-1984 and post-1984. βkX(t) is defined as indicated in the panel
heading. μk denotes time-series means of the share of proprietary income for
every state k in the period from 1950 to 1955 and μ¯ is the cross-sectional
mean of μk. dkXt contains time and state fixed effects and the constant (esti-
mates not reported). The data are annual from 1963 to 2005. T-statistics in
parentheses. Significance at the 10% (5%) level is indicated by ∗(∗∗). In both
panels standard errors are based on clustering by state.
Panel A
μk = shapi (share of proprietary income 1950-1955)
1964-1984 1985-2005
low middle high low middle high
aU 0.15* 0.38** 0.28** 0.10 0.20* 0.14
(1.87) (3.81) (3.39) (0.63) (1.71) (1.21)
bU 0.09 -4.00 -5.22* 2.05 1.34 -4.01
(0.06) (-1.53) (-1.73) (0.69) (0.42) (-1.14)
Panel B
βkX(t) = bX0Δgdpt + bX1Δgdpt × (μk − μ¯) + aX0 + aX1(μk − μ¯)
1964-1984 1985-2005
(I) (F ) (C) (U ) (I) (F ) (C) (U )
bX0 -0.86 -0.12 4.14** -3.15** 0.28 -3.92 4.91 -1.27
(-0.94) (-0.36) (3.19) (-2.70) (0.12) (-1.14) (1.28) (-0.76)
bX1 -7.03 -2.38 44.95** -35.54** -36.09 -23.20 80.84** -21.56
(-0.81) (-0.81) (3.05) (-2.89) (-0.97) (-1.00) (2.10) (-1.21)
aX0 0.50** 0.04 0.21** 0.26** 0.65** 0.23** -0.07 0.19**
(12.52) (1.14) (2.25) (4.82) (6.36) (2.05) (-0.60) (2.43)
aX1 -1.93** 0.73** 0.49 0.70 -0.45 0.81 -0.50 0.14
(-3.97) (1.96) (0.45) (1.11) (-0.30) (1.09) (-0.36) (0.15)
Table 4: Risk Sharing, Banking Deregulation and the Business Cycle (OLS)



















t − c˜kt , c˜kt for
X = I, F , C, U respectively. βX(t) is defined as indicated in the panel head-
ing. SDkt is the intrastate deregulation dummy, which is 1 from the year
of state k’s intrastate deregulation onwards. Pt and Tt are dummies for the
peak and trough dates from the NBER business cycle database. dkXt con-
tains time and state fixed effects and the constant (estimate not reported).
cX is not reported. The data are annual from 1963 to 2005. T-statistics
in parentheses. Significance at the 10% (5%) level is indicated by ∗(∗∗). In
both panels standard errors are based on clustering by state.
(I) (F ) (C) (U)
Panel A: βkX(t) = bX0Δgdpt + bX1Δgdpt × SDkt + aX0 + aX1SDkt
bX0 -4.29** 0.30 10.07** -6.08**
(-3.59) (1.06) (3.90) (-3.08)
bX1 4.44** 0.59 -9.24** 4.21
(2.56) (0.71) (-2.31) (1.53)
aX0 0.55** 0.09** 0.01 0.35**
(9.74) (6.17) (0.09) (5.90)
aX1 0.08 -0.08 0.13 -0.13
(1.32) (-1.57) (1.30) (-1.44)
Panel B: βkX(t) = bX0Pt + bX1Tt + bX2Pt × SDkt + bX3Tt × SDkt + aX0 + aX1SDkt
bX0 -0.15 -0.00 0.29** -0.13
(-1.47) (-0.16) (2.03) (-1.59)
bX1 0.24** -0.00 -0.53** 0.30**
(2.76) (-0.23) (-3.65) (3.46)
bX2 0.16 -0.21 -0.04 0.09
(0.82) (-1.29) (-0.21) (0.53)
bX3 -0.29** 0.01 0.53** -0.25**
(-2.74) (0.29) (3.02) (-2.40)
aX0 0.41** 0.10** 0.35** 0.14**
(7.95) (9.07) (3.84) (2.93)
aX1 0.24** -0.03 -0.24** 0.03
(3.26) (-1.10) (-3.10) (0.54)
F-Test (p-value) of H0: Deregulation removes cyclicality in risk sharing ...
in booms

















Table 5: Risk Sharing, Banking Deregulation and Small Businesses
The table reports the results of the panel OLS regression for the






Ut, where βU (t) =
aU + bUΔgdpt. The states are split into four categories: above/below
median small business importance and whether the state had al-
ready deregulated by 1984 or not (early/late deregulation). dkXt con-
tains time and state fixed effects and the constant (estimates not
reported). The data are annual from 1963 to 1984. T-statistics in
parentheses. Significance at the 10% (5%) level is indicated by ∗(∗∗).
Standard errors are based on clustering by state. "Obs." denotes
the number of observations in the respective category.
μk = shapi (share of proprietary income 1964-1975)
early deregulation late deregulation
low μk high μk low μk high μk
aU 0.14* 0.37** 0.42** 0.26**
(1.82) (2.44) (4.58) (3.63)
bU -0.82 -6.69 -2.42 -6.38**
(-0.53) (-1.55) (-1.11) (-2.91)
Obs. 378 126 147 420
μk = SBE (Small Business Employment in 1977)
early deregulation late deregulation
low μk high μk low μk high μk
aU 0.47** 0.12* 0.30** 0.23**
(4.47) (1.85) (3.04) (3.19)
bU -2.15 -1.97 -3.03 -5.41**
(-0.46) (-0.89) (-1.58) (-2.30)
Obs. 315 189 210 357
































FIGURE 1: The blue, solid line is the coefficient βU (t) of the sequence of cross-




t for t = 1964...2005. The red, dashed






















Degree of Uninsured Risk around NBER Trough
FIGURE 2: Burns-Mitchell diagram of the fraction of unshared risk around
NBER recession troughs, distinguishing between states that have not yet (blue,
solid line) and those that have already (red, dashed line) deregulated. This frac-







define the set of NBER trough dates. Altogether, our
sample contains N = 6 NBER recession troughs that define a total of 306 = 6× 51
(50 states+ Washington D.C.) state-recession events. At each trough date, we
split the 51 state-recession events into two groups, according to whether state
k had deregulated at that trough t ∈ Itrough or not. We then pool state-recession
events (by group) across all troughs and run the cross-sectional regressions
Δc˜kt+l = βU (l)Δg˜sp
k
t+l + τt+l +ε
k
t+l for l = −1, 0, 1 and t ∈ Itrough, once for deregulated
and once for not-yet-deregulated state-recession events. In this way, we obtain
the typical time profile of risk sharing for each group one year before a trough
(l = −1), in the year of trough itself (l = 0) and one year after (l = 1) . The plot
gives the estimated βU (l) for the two groups.
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